Bulletin n° 14 - décembre 2015

 


The a posteriori constitutional review of the laws in France and Colombia

Jessica PICON (élève avocat de l'HEDAC / ISIT)

The French constitutional history has been led by the Article 6 of the Declaration of Human and Civic Rights of 26 August 1789, which states, “The Law is the expression of the general will”[1]. This Article put a sort of “immunity” to all the Acts of Parliament after their enactments[2]. Indeed, since their creation, all the French courts always refused to review the constitutionality of a law[3] and the Fifth French Republic Constitution of 1958, which created the Conseil constitutionnel (Constitutional Council), gave it only the power to exercise an a priori constitutional review. Thus, the a posteriori review of a law appeared to be in France a “revolution”[4].

At first, only four bodies – the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, the President of the National Assembly and the President of the Senate – were allowed to challenge the constitutionality of a law before it entered into force by seizing the Constitutional Council. With the constitutional amendment of 1974, the petition of constitutional review of Acts of Parliament before their promulgation was opened to sixty Members of the French National Assembly or to sixty Members of the French Senate[5]. But before 2008, and even though the Constitutional Council stated that the constitutionality of a law already promulgated could be reviewed in the same time of the review of a legislative amendment which modifies, completes or affects that same law[6], no one could challenge a law that had already came into force.

The lack of an a posteriori review introduced problems regarding the enforcement of the Constitution. Indeed it is optional for the authorized political bodies to refer back to the Constitutional Council; so a law in conflict with the Constitution can perfectly be applied – and shall be applied – by the ordinary courts, thus infringing the rights of individuals. Moreover, the referral to the Conseil constitutionnel by the competent bodies takes part of a political strategy, which eludes the citizens[7] and derives from the context in which the law is adopted. Finally, the possibility of the a priori review is confronted with the public opinion, which could be presumed to be in favour of a proposal even though some of its provisions would likely be unconstitutional. For instance the major issue about the growth of terrorism pushed the Parliament to adopt a law[8] without deferring it to any review by the Constitutional Council; this resulted in scholars and practitioners considering it a “liberty killer”[9].

By establishing an a posteriori review with the introduction of the question prioritaire de constitutionnalité (“priority preliminary rulings procedure”[10]) or QPC, the constitutional amendment of 23 July 2008 made a first step towards the resolution of this uncomfortable situation, even though it does not solve the whole dilemma. Indeed, the a posteriori review will only be engaged when a dispute arises and if one of the Supreme Courts (the Cour de cassation, the highest court of the judiciary, or the Conseil d’Etat, the highest court of the administrative order) accepts to refer the legislative provision before the Constitutional Council. Thus merely a few legal provisions can be reviewed.

An a posteriori review empowers a designated entity to question the constitutionality of a legislative norm after it was promulgated. The QPC mechanism is an evolution of the concept of constitutional law in France: it breaks an old taboo and implies a change of mentality regarding the Constitution and the rights and liberties that it guarantees[11]. Basically, it allows a party to a dispute brought before an ordinary judge to challenge a statutory provision after its enactment. In the pending case, one can invoke the application of a legislative provision. If the other party considers the provision unconstitutional, the latter has now the ability to ask for its constitutional review.

The QPC will be treated in “priority” by the judge[12], contrary to the conventionality review, and before a preliminary question. Thus, the constitutional review of a law will be prior to any other review. With this mechanism, the Institutional legislator made sure that the law deemed to be unconstitutional would send before the Constitutional Council by the ordinary judges instead of applying a conventionality review, which is most frequently used[13]. Additionally, the Institutional legislator wanted to put back the Constitution forward[14].

If the a posteriori review of a law has been applied since the 1st of March 2010 in France, Colombia on the other hand knows this review since a century. With the adoption of the Legislative Act #3 of 31 October 1910, Colombia entrusted the Corte Suprema de Justicia (Supreme Court of Justice, the highest ordinary court of the judiciary) with the duty to guard the integrity of the Constitution of 1886. The latter establishes the priority of constitutional provisions over the legislatives’ ones. This hierarchy principle was already implemented by the Constitution of 1886 by giving to the Corte Suprema de Justicia the power to decide of the constitutional validity of bills[15]. However, a year later, Colombia adopted a new law establishing that clear provisions of laws promulgated after the Constitution are presumed to be constitutional and will be applied even if they seem contrary to the Constitution[16]; thus excluding in a way an a posteriori review.

The constitutional reform of 1910 created two kinds of review: the acción pública de inconstitucionalidad (public action of unconstitutionality) and the excepción de inconstitucionalidad[17] (exception of unconstitutionality). The Article 41 of the Legislative Act #3 of 1910 states that “The safeguarding of the integrity of the Constitution is entrusted to the Supreme Court of Justice. In consequence of what, in addition to the abilities given by this Act and the Laws, the Supreme Court of Justice will have the following power: decide permanently of the enforceability of Legislative Acts of which the constitutional validity is challenged by the Government, or of all the laws and decrees of which the constitutional validity is challenged by any citizens, prior to an audition of the General Lawyer of the Nation” (Procurador General de la Nación).

Yet, Colombia waited until another important constitutional reform to create a special entity entrusted with jurisdiction over constitutional issues. Article 241 of the Constitution of 1991 transferred the safeguarding of constitutional provisions to the Corte Constitucional (Constitutional Court), stating “The safeguarding of the integrity and supremacy of the Constitution is entrusted to the Constitutional Court in the strict and precise terms of this article”[18].

Even though both countries now possess an a posteriori constitutional review procedure, it is exercised in different ways. They both have a centralized constitutional review system entrusted respectively to specialized bodies (I). However, unlike in France in which the constitutional review has been in some way “monopolized” by the ordinary courts, the Colombian constitutional law has knowingly adopted a diffuse system, giving the ordinary courts powers in the constitutional review of laws, thus adopting a mixed system (II).

A centralized review system in France and Colombia

In a centralized system “a dedicated body is the only state organ granted the power to make authoritative determinations on the constitutionality of a law”[19]. The Colombian public action of constitutionality which was instituted in 1910 was the first centralized constitutional review mechanism implemented in the world[20]. The constitutional reform of 1991 reinforced this centralized system by entrusting the review to a specialized body[21] (A). A century later, France adopted a centralized a posteriori review quite different from the one in Colombia (B).

A direct action to challenge the constitutionality of laws in front of the Colombian Constitutional Court: la acción pública de inconstitucionalidad

“I would wish to be a citizen, a free man, so that all may be free men. I prefer the name of Citizen to that of Liberator, for the latter being born of war; the former is born of law. I beseech thee, Sir, I should give up all my titles, if in exchange I could procure but one: that of The Good Citizen”[22].

Bolivar’s speech shows the importance attached to the participation of the citizens in Colombia. In fact, they have special rights regarding constitutional law. For instance, the 1991 reform introduced a new constitutional mechanism called acción de tutela[23], a legal action to give immediate protection of fundamental rights that are threatened or weakened by the actions or omissions of the public authorities or an individual[24].

Another example of the rights of citizens in constitutional law is the public action of unconstitutionality, also known as demanda pública de inconstitucionalidad. According to article 40 of the Constitución Política (the Colombian Constitution): “(…) the citizen may: 6. Undertake public measures in defense of the Constitution and the law”. Therefore this action allows any citizen to challenge laws already promulgated directly before the Constitutional Court[25], making them defenders of the Constitution. The mere fact of being a Colombian national is enough to introduce a public action; there is no need to be a professional or to have a special preparation[26]. However, this means that an alien cannot introduce an action before the Constitutional Court; neither legal entities nor persons under 18 years can do so. In addition, the possibility to challenge the constitutionality of laws is considered to be a political right for every citizen[27], as well as a fundamental right[28]. This implies that the claimant needs to bring elements that prove that he or she is a Colombian citizen and also that he or she exercises his or her political and civil rights[29].

Finally, the petition has to contain a certain amount of information, which is set by the decreto 2067 of 4 September 1991. Its article 20 indicates that the petition needs to be in writing and that the claimant needs to produce (1) the norm accused to be unconstitutional, its content or a copy of its official publication; (2) the constitutional provisions which are considered to be infringed; (3) the reasons why said provisions are considered to be infringed; (4) if appropriate, the constitutional procedure applicable for the established act and the way in which it has been breached; and (5) the reason why the Court has jurisdiction over this matter. These requirements are seen as “reasonable minimums” which do not impeach the right of citizens without constitutional law expertise to initiate an action[30].

If the petition respects the aforementioned conditions, the Constitutional Court will decide on the constitutionality of the law submitted to it. If the norm is declared unconstitutional, the Court will pronounce its expulsion of the legal order – la inexequibilidad –; although the Court can decide to postpone the expulsion of the norm to a given date.

The established review procedure as a public action is considered to be “abstract”. There is no subjective interest of the citizen requested; he or she merely uses his or her protection granted by the Constitution. For that reason, the decisions of the Constitutional Court produce an erga omnes effect. Though, not the entire decision is a “source of obligation” for the ordinary judges. The Constitutional Court distinguishes between the ruling and the motivation. The Court explains that the ruling in itself and the motivated part that forms a unity of meaning with the ruling is binding; the other motivated part is considered to be obiter dicta in the sense of the article 230 of the Constitution[31] and thus does not bind the ordinary judges.

In France, the review of the laws is centralized in the hands of the Constitutional Council, which will have the same powers than the Colombian Constitutional Court. However, the conditions to access to the Constitutional Council are more restrictive.

The French Constitutional Council: a sole jurisdiction to rule on a question prioritaire de constitutionnalité

The constitutional amendment of 23 July 2008 introduced a new article in the Constitution which states: “If, during proceedings in progress before a court of law, it is claimed that a legislative provision infringes the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution, the matter may be referred by the Conseil d’Etat or by the Cour de cassation to the Constitutional Council which shall rule within a determined period”[32].

This a posteriori review implies three main differences with the Colombian public action. Firstly, the possibility to challenge the constitutionality of a law is not given to any French citizen but only to parties to proceedings already engaged. Accordingly, aliens and legal entities can make a petition for the constitutional review of a law.

However and secondly, they cannot introduce a petition directly before the Constitutional Council. The a posteriori review of a law is only activated by parties if they have submitted a dispute that arose between them in a court of law. This condition of being engaged in litigation has an impact on the interest and the standing of the claimant to ask for a ruling of unconstitutionality. As it has been seen, a Colombian citizen is considered to be the defender of the Constitution and, thus, can challenge any legislative provision, which he or she considers to be in breach of the Constitution. In France, a party can only challenge a law, which has an impact on the underlying dispute[33]. All the more, the referring of the petition of a party to review the constitutionality of a law to the Constitutional Council is conditioned by the good will of the Conseil d’Etat or the Cour de cassation. These Supreme Courts exercise a role of “filter” by controlling the validity of petitions. This filter system was created by the Institutional Legislator to prevent saturation of the Constitutional Council due to an excessive number of petitions.

Finally, the legislative provision needs to infringe “the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution”. The Legislator has not defined these terms; thus, it belongs to the Constitutional Council to determine what can be reviewed under article 61-1 of the Constitution[34]. Regarding the rulings of the Constitutional Council, the “rights and freedoms guaranteed” are the ones found in the whole “Block of constitutionality”[35], including the Declaration of Human and Civic Rights of 1789, the Preamble of the 1946 Constitution or the Charte de l’Environnement of 2004 (Environmental Charter). However, a law will not be reviewed if it only concerns a legal technicality[36], contrary to the Colombian system. In this case, the Cour de cassation or the Conseil d’Etat will declare the petition inadmissible and will refuse to refer it before the Conseil Constitutionnel.

If the a posteriori review can only be activated during litigation before a court of law, the review will be in all cases an abstract one[37]. Indeed, the Constitutional Council will not take into account the facts of the case in front of the ordinary court. This is confirmed by the first paragraph of the article 23-1 of the Ordinance of 1958[38], which imposes that the QPC needs to be introduced in a separate and motivated writing; otherwise it will be inadmissible.

Like the decisions of the Colombian Constitutional Court, the decisions of the Constitutional Council can repeal a law that is considered to be unconstitutional[39]. The Constitutional Council can also precise how to interpret a law so that its application would be in compliance with the Constitution[40]. Consequently, the decisions have an erga omnes effect. In contrast with the rulings of the Constitutional Court, the decisions of the Constitutional Council are legally binding in their entirety: the motivated part is imposed on the public authorities, as well as on the administrative and judicial bodies[41]. Finally, the Constitutional Council can adapt the repeal of the law over time: the law can be annulled retrospectively or the repeal can be postponed to a given date, especially to enable the Legislator to plug a legal loophole[42]. For instance, even though the Constitutional Council pronounced the unconstitutionality of articles of the Code of Criminal Procedure on the custody of a person (articles relatifs à la garde à vue), it postponed the effects of the declaration of unconstitutionality to the 1st of July 2011. Accordingly, measures taken under these articles will not be voidable on the basis of unconstitutionality[43].

Both constitutional review procedures – the French and the Colombian – have the same effect, even though they are not exercised in the same way. In particular, the Colombian a posteriori review is open to a wider range of laws, but restricted to the citizens. This is solved by the power given to the ordinary courts to exercise a diffuse review. In France, the institutional Legislator had no intention to introduce this kind of system, but it seems that it has emerged regardless.

A different approach regarding the diffuse review

The diffuse review is the limited review of constitutional questions that arise in the course of proceedings before a judge or an administrative authority and exercised by them without referring it to a specialized body. As previously shown, the constitutional review of laws in Franceis considered to be a dominant centralized system, but the relationship between the French Constitutional Council and the ordinary courts has raised questions on the birth of a diffuse review (A). On the contrary, Colombia has established knowingly a diffuse review with the excepción de inconstitucionalidad (B).

The “double filter system”: a first constitutional review?

To recall, under the French constitutional review system, it is up to individuals to challenge the constitutionality of a law within the framework of legal proceedings before an ordinary court. As a result, the court or tribunal a quo – the court or tribunal before which the proceedings are initiated – will examine whether the QPC respects the conditions set out by the Article 23-2 of the Ordinance of 1958 and shall be transferred to the Supreme Court: either the Conseil d’Etat for administrative matters or the Cour de Cassation for civil, employment, commercial and criminal matters. It is then for the Supreme Court to decide whether or not the QPC is worth the attention of the Constitutional Council. In other words, the French system lays down the cooperation between the Constitutional Council and the ordinary courts[44].

This system was designed to prevent an excess of workload for the Constitutional Council and to avoid that it had to examine frivolous petitions aimed at delaying proceedings before the court a quo until a decision is rendered on the constitutional issue[45]. However, experience showed that, while examining if a petition of unconstitutionality is serious, the Supreme Courts exercise in fact a first review of the law[46].

The criterion of the seriousness of a constitutional issue “means that the issue should never have been dealt with by the Constitutional Council before or should be completely new”[47]. The Supreme Courts enforce this condition in their very own way. For example, they refused to refer back to the Constitutional Council laws that had already been submitted for an a priori review. Here, the problem is that if the bill or some of its provisions were firstly deemed unconstitutional, the constitutional judge does not indicate exactly what the bill should contain to be constitutional, and if it does, its propositions do not bind the Parliament[48]. A bill declared unconstitutional in the process of an a priori review could still be unconstitutional after its modification and enactment. Thus, the refusal by the Supreme Courts to defer the law to the Constitutional Council for an a posteriori review implies that the law is deemed constitutional[49]. By deciding if a petition is serious, the Supreme Courts actually attract for themselves a part of the a posteriori review that belongs to the Constitutional Council[50].

The refusal to submit to the Constitutional Council the loi Gayssot[51] – making it an offense to question the reality of crimes against humanity – is another example of the attraction of a part of the a posteriori review. The constitutionality of this law was an issue for some lawyers and historians[52], but the Cour de cassation considered that the question was not serious to the extent that the incrimination did not infringe the constitutional principle of freedom of speech, therefore issuing a pronouncement on the constitutionality of the law[53].  

Finally, the Cour de cassation attracted another part of the a posteriori review by refusing to refer to the Constitutional Council a question of constitutionality of a law, considering that it was not challenging the constitutionality of the provision, but was aimed at the interpretation adopted by the Cour de cassation with regard to said provision[54]. This decision had for effect to deprive the Constitutional Council of a part of the review that belongs to it and to let potential unconstitutional interpretations thrive. The Constitutional Council, in a decision of 6 October 2010[55], put a stop to this appreciation of the seriousness of a petition by indicating that the constitutionality of a norm should be reviewed taking also into account the case law of the Supreme Courts[56].

In a nutshell, the centralized a posteriori review procedure envisaged shifted, through the practice of the Supreme Courts’ filter, towards a diffuse system. But it seems that the cooperation between the Supreme Courts and the Constitutional Council is working better, erasing the different issues that had emerged with the introduction of the QPC. In that sense, some scholars refuse to recognize the existence of any kind of diffuse review in France[57], contrary to Colombia which knows this sort of review in front of the ordinary courts.

A diffuse review guaranteed by the excepción de inconstitucionalidad

The mechanism of the exception of unconstitutionality is based on the Article 4 of the Colombian Constitution[58] which states that “The Constitution provides the norm of regulation. In all cases of incompatibility between the Constitution and the law or other legal regulations, the constitutional provisions will apply”[59]. Unlike the public action, the exception of unconstitutionality is a concrete review. It means that, like the French QPC, the exception may be raised during proceedings before the judge or, in Colombia, also before an administrative authority[60]. Any party to the proceedings[61], the judge or the administrative authorities is empowered to raise the unconstitutionality of a law[62]. Thus, in Colombia the judge can raise ex officio the unconstitutionality of a norm, which is forbidden to the French judges.

However, the law needs to be applicable to the case at hand[63] and the judge or the administrative authorities will also have to take into account whether or not the Constitutional Court has already declared the law constitutional[64].

In that event, the law will not be set aside. On the contrary, if the law has never been pronounced constitutional, and that regarding the case at stake, it is considered to be breaching the provisions of the Constitution, the judge or the administrative authorities will abstain from enforcing the said law[65] when delivering its decision. Yet, it does not disappear from the legal order[66] since only the Constitutional Court has the power to repeal laws.

Finally, the pronounced decision setting aside a law for being in conflict with the Constitution will not have erga omnes effects. It produces its legal effects only inter partes[67]. Consequently, it is still possible to apply that same law in another case if another judge or administrative authority has not concluded to its unconstitutionality. This leads to legal uncertainty.

Summing up, the Colombian a posteriori review system is interesting because it constitutes a public action that allows any citizen, at any time, to challenge the constitutionality of a law. The Colombian exception of unconstitutionality, however, can cause some disorder in the application of laws that have not been previously reviewed by the Constitutional Court. Still, the French QPC is not more efficient, especially because of the stringent access conditions to the constitutional judge.

A system combining the Colombian public action and the French QPC would allow, in our opinion, a better review of the laws once they have entered into force. For instance, the possibility to defend the Constitution at any time, without having to be a party to proceedings before a court of law could be given to all the citizens of the State as it is in Colombia. In such a case, in order to prevent an excessive increase of workload of the Constitutional Court or Council, it could be limited to some entities, like authorized associations. We can imagine these associations like the ones that exist for consumers, but in this case, they would stand for the protection of the Constitution. Additionally, a party to proceedings could be allowed to challenge a legislative provision without going through an authorized entity. It would guarantee that an unconstitutional provision would not be applied to the case at hand. By preferring the QPC system to the exception of unconstitutionality, we would prevent that an unconstitutional law could be applied in a case and put aside in another.



1 - English source from www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr[retour]

2 - PHILIPPE X., “Constitutional Review in France: The Extended Role of The Conseil Constitutionnel Through The New Priority Preliminary Rulings Procedure (QPC)”, Annales Scientiarum Budapestinensis de Rolando, Vol. 53, 2012, p. 65.  [retour]

3 - BONNET J., Le juge ordinaire français et le contrôle de la constitutionnalité des lois, Dalloz, Paris, 2009, p. 1.  [retour]

4 - PHILIPPE X., “Constitutional Review …Rulings Procedure (QPC)”, p. 66.  [retour]

5 - Article 61 §2 of the French Constitution of 1958.  [retour]

6 - French Constitutional Council, decision of 25 January 1985, n° 88-187 DC.  [retour]

7 - KERLEO J.-F., “Les lois non déférées au contrôle de constitutionnalité a priori”, Revue générale du droit, n°3, 2014, p. 3.  [retour]

8 - Loi n° 2014-1353 of November 13th, 2014, strengthening provisions on the fight against terrorism (renforçant les dispositions relatives à la lutte contre le terrorisme).  [retour]

9 - CAPPELLO A., “L’interdiction de sortie du territoire dans la loi renforçant les dispositions relatives à la lute contre le terrorisme”, AJ Pénal, n° 12, 2014, p. 560 ; GODEBERGE C. and DAOUD E., “La loi du 13 novembre 2014 constitue-t-elle une atteinte à la liberté d’expression. De la nouvelle définition de la provocation aux actes de terrorisme et apologie de ces actes”, AJ Pénal, n° 12, 2014, p.563 ; SYNDICAT DE LA MAGISTRATURE, “Observations sur le projet de loi renforçant les dispositions relatives à la lutte contre le terrorisme”, September 24th, 2014, also “Apologie du terrorisme : Résister à l’injonction de la répression immédiate !”, January 20th 2015, www.syndicat-magistrature.org[retour]

10 - PHILIPPE X., “Constitutional Review …Rulings Procedure (QPC)”, p. 65.  [retour]

11 - PHILIPPE X., “La question prioritaire de constitutionnalité : à l’aube d’une nouvelle ère pour le contentieux constitutionnel français… Réflexions après l’adoption de la loi organique”, Revue française de droit constitutionnel, n° 82, 2010, pp. 275-276.  [retour]

12 - GUILLAUME M., “La question prioritaire de constitutionnalité : textes applicables et premières décisions”, Les nouveaux cahiers du Conseil constitutionnel, n° 29, octobre 2010, p. 23.  [retour]

13 - APCHAIN H., « La QPC et le contrôle de conventionalité : complémentarité ou antagonisme », www.credho.org, juin 2012, p. 4.  [retour]

14 - BON P., “La question prioritaire de constitutionnalité après la loi organique du 19 décembre 2009”, RFDA, n° 6, 2009, p. 1109.  [retour]

15 - CHINCHILLA HERRERA T., “Concepciones sobre el Juez Constitucional en la Reforma de 1910: una cuestión de confianza”, Diálogos de Derecho y Política, n° 3, Enero-Abril de 2010, p. 7.  [retour]

16 - Article 6, Ley 153, 15 August 1887, coming into force August 28th,1887.  [retour]

17 - MORENO ORTIZ L.-J., “El sistema de control de constitucionalidad en Colombia”, Civilizar, N° 19, Julio – Diciembre 2010, p. 76.  [retour]

18 - English version of Colombia’s Constitution of 1991.  [retour]

19 - GLENN BASS K., CHOUDHRY S., “Constitutional review in new democracies”, Democracy reporting international, September 2013, p. 2.  [retour]

20 - CHINCHILLA HERRERA T., “Concepciones sobre el Juez Constitucional… una cuestión de confianza”, p. 3.  [retour]

21 - GIACOMMETTE FERRER A., “Acción pública de inconstitucionalidad de las leyes”, in FERRER MAC-GREGOR E., ZALIVAR LELO DE LARREA A. (dir.), “La ciencia del derecho procesal constitucional. Estudios en homenaje a Héctor Fix-Zamudio en sus cincuenta años como investigador del derecho”, UNAM, Tomo VIII, México, 2008, p. 230.  [retour]

22 - BOLIVAR’s speech, Congress of Cúcuta, October 3rd, 1821.  [retour]

23 - USCANGA BARRADAS A., LOPEZ CARDENAS C. M., “La protección de los derechos fundamentales frente a particulares: el amparo en México y la acción de tutela en Colombia”, Revista de la facultad de derecho de México, vol. 61, n° 256, Julio-Diciembre 2011, p. 348.  [retour]

24 - CIFUENTES MUNOZ E., “La acción de tutela en Colombia”, Ius et Praxis, vol. 3, n° 1, 1997, p. 165.  [retour]

25 - Ponencia República de Colombia, “Normatividad y supremacía jurídica de la Constitución”, Conferencia iberoamericana de justicia constitucional, Santo Domingo, República Dominicana, March 12th-15th, 2014, p. 40.  [retour]

26 - Procedimiento para presentar demandas de inconstitucionalidad, http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/secretaria/otros/procedimiento.php[retour]

27 - Colombian Constitutional Court, Sentencia C-131/93, M. P. ALEJANDRO MARTINEZ CABALLERO, 1 abril 1993.  [retour]

28 - REY CANTOR E., “Acción popular de inconstitucionalidad”, Revista del centro de Estudios Constitucionales, n° 1, 2003, p. 344.  [retour]

29 - Colombian Constitutional Court, Sentencia C-562/00, M. P. VLADIMIRO NARANJO MESA, 17 mayo 2000.  [retour]

30 - Colombian Constitutional Court, Sentencia C-131/93, M. P. ALEJANDRO MARTINEZ CABALLERO, 1 abril 1993.  [retour]

31 - Idem.  [retour]

32 - Article 61-1 of the French Constitution, Article 61-1 (english version).  [retour]

33 - Ordonnance n° 58-1067 du 7 novembre 1958 portant loi organique sur le Conseil constitutionnel, modifié par la loi organique n° 2009-1523 du 10 décembre 2009, article 23-2, 1°.  [retour]

34 - REDOR-FICHOT M.-J., “Le Conseil constitutionnel, la question prioritaire de constitutionnalité et ‘les droits et libertés que la Constitution garantit’ ”, Cahiers de la recherche sur les droits fondamentaux, éd. Presse universitaire de Caen, n° 9, 2011, p. 43.  [retour]

35 - Ibid., pp. 42-43.  [retour]

36 - SANTOLINI T., “La question prioritaire de constitutionnalité au regard du droit comparé”, Revue française de droit constitutionnel, 2012, p. 96.  [retour]

37 - Ibid., p. 104.  [retour]

38 - Ordonnance n° 58-1067 du 7 novembre 1958 portant loi organique sur le Conseil constitutionnel, modifié par la loi organique n° 2009-1523 du 10 décembre 2009.  [retour]

39 - Article 62, § 2 of the French Constitution.  [retour]

40 - Assemblée Nationale, “Le contrôle de la constitutionnalité des lois”, Fiche de synthèse n° 39, 16 avril 2014.  [retour]

41 - Idem.  [retour]

42 - PHILIPPE X., “La question prioritaire de constitutionalité…”, op cit. pp. 286.  [retour]

43 - French Constitutional Council, decision n° 2010-14/22 QPC, 30rd July 2010.  [retour]

44 - MOLFESSIS N., “La résistance immédiate de la Cour de cassation à la QPC”, Pouvoirs, n° 137, 2011, p. 85.  [retour]

45 - SANTOLINI T., “La question prioritaire de constitutionnalité…”, p. 87.  [retour]

46 - FATIN-ROUGE STEFANINI M., “Le filtre exercé par le Conseil d’Etat”, in GAY L., BON P., DI MANNO T. (dir.), La QPC vue du droit comparé. Le contrôle de constitutionnalité sur renvoi du juge ordinaire en France, Espagne et Italie, March 2013, p. 11 (version pdf.).  [retour]

47 - PHILIPPE X., “Constitutional Review …Rulings Procedure (QPC)”, p. 72; French Constitutional Council, decision 2009-595 DC, December 3rd; 009.  [retour]

48 - KERLEO J.-F., “Les lois non déférées au contrôle a priori”, Revue générale du droit, n° 3, 2014, pp. 13-14.  [retour]

49 - Ibid., p. 14.  [retour]

50 - SANTOLINI T., “La question prioritaire de constitutionnalité…”, op.cit., p. 89.  [retour]

51  Loi n° 90-615 of 13 July 1990, stretching towards the prosecution of all acts of racism, anti-semitism or xenophobia (tendant à réprimer tout acte raciste, antisémite ou xénophobe).  [retour]

52 - SALLES A., “La Cour de cassation ‘juge’ constitutionnelle la loi sur les crimes contre l’humanité”, Le Monde, August 8th, 2010.  [retour]

53 - MOLFESSIS N., “La résistance immédiate de la Cour de cassation à la QPC”, Pouvoirs, n° 137, 2011, p. 87 ; Commission des lois constitutionnelles, de la législation et de l’administration générale de la République, Rapport d’information 2838 sur “l’évaluation de la loi organique 2009-1523 du 10 décembre 2009 relative à l’application de l’article 61-1 de la Constitution”, Assemblée Nationale, 5 October 2010.  [retour]

54 - BERRIER (J.-B.), “La Cour de cassation et la question prioritaire de constitutionnalité : de la réticence à la diligence”, Revue française de droit constitutionnel, n° 84, 2010, p. 799.  [retour]

55 - French Constitutional Council, decision n° 2010-39 QPC, 6 October 2010.  [retour]

56 - Commentaire sur la décision n° 2010-39 QPC du 6 octobre 2010, Les Cahiers du Conseil constitutionnel, n° 30.  [retour]

57 - PHILIPPE X., “Consitutional Review …Rulings Procedure (QPC)”, p. 75.  [retour]

58 - Colombian Constitutional Court, Sentencia C-122/11, March 1st, 2011, M.P. JUAN CARLOS HENAO PEREZ.  [retour]

59 - Colombian Constitution of 1991 (english version).  [retour]

60 - MORENO ORTIZ L.-J., “El sistema de control de constitucionalidad en Colombia”, Civilizar, n° 19, Julio-Diciembre 2010, p. 76.  [retour]

61 - REY CLAVIJO J.-G., “El control constitucional en Colombia a partir de la Constitución de 1991”, Via Iuris, n° 4, Enero-Junio, 2008, p. 67.  [retour]

62 - Colombian Constitutional Court, Sentencia C-122/11, March 1st, 2011, M.P. JUAN CARLOS HENAO PEREZ.  [retour]

63 - REY CLAVIJO J.-G., “El control constitucional en Colombia …”, p. 67.  [retour]

64 - Colombian Constitutional Court, Sentencia T-103, February 16th, 2010, M.P. Dr. JORGE IVAN PALACIO PALACIO.  [retour]

65 - Ponencia República de Colombia, “normatividad y supremacía jurídica de la Constitución”, Conferencia iberoamericana de justicia constitucional, 12 al 15 de Marzo de 2014, Santo Domingo, República Dominicana, p. 40.  [retour]

66 - REY CLAVIJO J.-G., “El control constitucional en Colombia …”, p. 69.  [retour]

67 - BLANCO ZUNIGA G. A., “Comentarios a la excepción de inconstitucionalidad y la excepción de ilegalidad en Colombia”, Revista de Derecho, Universidad del Norte, vol. 1, 2001, p. 270.   [retour]

ISIT - CRATIL

39 bis rue d'Assas
75006 Paris
+33 (0)1 42 22 33 16 
Design: Page18 Interactive
Le Bulletin du CRATIL - ISSN 2263-7591 2015-Tous droits réservés ©